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Striking Down the Clergyman-Communicant Privilege
Statutes: Let Free Exercise of Religion Govern
INTRODUCTION

Clergymen' possessing confidential information gained through spiritual
counseling 2 occasionally face legal demand to reveal the contents of such
information. Clergy of all denominations have a strong aversion to disclosing
confidential communications, and they frequently incur contempt citations,
fines, and imprisonment rather than violate the confidence of their
communicants3 in a court of law. 4 Communications between clergymen and
their communicants force the law to balance two competing policies: the
need to elicit evidence important to the judicial process' search for the truth,
and the desire to maintain the integrity of the religious community by
protecting the secrecy of spiritual counseling.
The law has recognized the public interest in holding inviolable the confidentiality of communications between clergymen and communicants. 5 All
fifty states and the District of Columbia have enacted clergyman-communicant privilege statutes, 6 which excuse clergymen from testifying in judicial

I. The use of the masculine gender (clergyman) is not meant to indicate reference to males
only. Since it is recognized that there are many female members of the clergy, the use of the
masculine gender is used for convenience.
2. "Spiritual counseling" is the term used throughout this Note to describe the process
of giving advice and comfort to religious adherents. One commentator has referred to spiritual
or pastoral counseling as "processes that could properly be called confession, leading toward
processes that could be called forgiveness, reconciliation or absolution." Reese, Confidential
Communication to the Clergy, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 55, 84 (1963) (quoting R.E. Elliot, Guilt and
Forgiveness, Perkins School of Theology) (unpublished manuscript).
3. "Communicant" is the term used to describe the individual who is seeking spiritual
guidance. The Kansas statute, for example, defines a communicant (also referred to as "penitent") as follows:
"penitent" means a person who recognizes the existence and the authority of
God and who seeks or receives from a regular or duly ordained minister of religion
advice or assistance in determining or discharging his or her moral obligations,
or in obtaining God's mercy or forgiveness for past culpable conduct.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429(a)(4) (1976).
4. E.g., In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931); In re Williams, 269 N.C.
68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967).
5. The name "clergyman-communicant" is used throughout this Note to describe the
privilege, although it is sometimes referred to as the "priest-penitent" privilege. The term
"clergyman" is used in this context to include "ministers," "priests," "rabbis," and "religious
practitioners" of all denominations. See supra note 3 for a definition of "communicant."
6. ALA. CODE § 12-21-166 (Supp. 1986); ALASKA Cr. R., EVID. 506 (1982); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 28-1001, R. EVID. 505
(1979); CAL. EvWD. CODE §§ 1030-34 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-107 (Supp.
1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146(b) (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. R. EVID. 505
(1981); D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-309 (Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.505 (West Supp. 1979);
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proceedings regarding communications given to them in confidence.7 While

clergyman-communicant statutes have been the focus of much commentary8 ,
the constitutionality of the statutes has seldom been challenged. 9 This Note

will demonstrate that statutory grants of the clergyman-communicant privilege may constitute violations of the religion clauses of the first amendment. 0
Part I of this Note provides an overview of clergyman-communicant statutes. Part II examines the statutes in light of the establishment clause,
utilizing the current tests which the United States Supreme Court has adopted

in this area." Since establishment clause analysis will demonstrate that the
statutes are unconstitutional, Part III seeks to determine whether the loss

of the privilege would interfere with the clergyman's or communicant's free
exercise of religion. This Note will conclude that the statutory grant of the
clergyman-communicant privilege is unconstitutional and should be abolished.

GA. CODE. ANN. § 38419.1 (1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. R. EviD. 506 § 626-1 (1984); IDAHO
CODE § 9-203 (Supp. 1982); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-803 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-1-14-5 (West Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1986);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-429 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.210 (Supp. 1986); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 15:477 (West Supp. 1986); ME. CT. R., R. EVID. 505 (1982); MD. CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-111 (1984); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20A (West 1986); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West Supp. 1986);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 13-1-22 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.060 (Vernon Supp. 1986);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-804 (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-506 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §
49.255 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516:35 (Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-23
(West Supp. 1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-506 (Supp. 1985); N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 4505
(McKinney Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.2 (1981); N.D. R. EvID. 505 (1981); OIno
REV. CODE ANN. § 2317.02 (Page Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2505 (West Supp.
1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.260 (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5943 (Purdon Supp. 1986);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-17-23 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-90 (Law Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 19-13-17 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-1-206 (Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 3715a (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-24-8 (1977); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1607 (1973); VA. CODE § 8.01-400 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
5.60.060 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 48-2-10(a) (1986) (recognizing the privilege only in the
domestic relations area); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.06 (West 1975); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-12-101
(1977).

7. E.g., Kuhlmann, Communications to Clergymen- When are They Privileged?, 2 VAL.
U.L. REv. 265 (1968); Reese, supra note 2 at 36; Yellin, The History and Current Status of
the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1983).
8. See Stoyles, The Dilemma of the Constitutionalityof the Priest-PenitentPrivilege-the
Application of the Religion Clauses, 29 U. PrIT. L. REV. 27 (1967); Reese, supra note 2.
9. The first amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The establishment
clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). The free exercise clause is also applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10. See infra notes 46-118 and accompanying text.

11. Under free exercise analysis, laws which appear to violate the establishment clause may

be upheld as protecting the clergyman's or communicant's free exercise of religion. In some
cases, however, the state may have a compelling state interest of sufficient magnitude to outweigh
the clergyman's or communicant's free exercise of religion. See infra notes 119-55 and accompanying text.
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I.

AN OVERVIEW OF CLERGYMAN-COMMUNICANT STATUTES

An examination of the constitutionality of the clergyman-communicant

privilege requires an understanding of the extent to which courts and legislatures have recognized the privilege. The scope of the privilege is governed2
by the law of the jurisdiction in which the clergyman is called to testify.'
While the privilege was not recognized at common law,' 3 statutes protecting
communications to clergymen have now been enacted in all fifty states and
the District of Columbia.' 4 Courts have traditionally construed the statutes
narrowly, protecting only communications which meet the exact conditions
specified in the statutes.' 5 In some states, however, court decisions have
expanded the scope of the privilege through more liberal construction of the
statutes.'6 The following is a brief overview of the statutes which focuses
on three crucial issues presented in invoking the clergyman-communicant
privilege. First, whether the communication is told to a "clergyman." Second, to whom does the privilege belong. Third, when is a communication
considered "confidential."
Since there is no universal agreement as to who qualifies as a "clergyman"
for purposes of the privilege, 7 courts generally look to the specific statutory
language establishing the privilege. 8 Some courts also examine the doctrines
of the particular denomination in question to determine whether the individual qualifies as a "clergyman."' ' 9 While the traditional definition of "clergyman" includes only priests and ministers of conventional churches, 20 the
modem trend includes as "clergy" anyone who serves as a "spiritual emissary" of the church. 2' As a result, the privilege in some jurisdictions has

12. Kuhlmann, supra note 7, at 266.
13. Russell v. Jackson, 9 Hare 387, 391, 68 Eng. Rep. 558, 560 (Ch. 1851); Normanshaw
v. Normanshaw, 69 L.T.R. 468 (1893); Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ. Foundation, Inc.,
724 F.2d 413, 415 (4th Cir. 1984); Note, Evidence - Privileged Communications - Confession
to Minister Deemed Inadmissible in FederalCriminal Proceedings, 45 VA. L. REV. 599 (1959).
But cf. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (finding a developed federal
common law when no statutory privilege was available).
14. See supra note 6.
15. See, e.g., Knight v. Lee, 80 Ind. 201 (1881); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557,
221 S.W.2d 87 (1949); Commonwealth v. Gallo, 275 Mass. 320, 175 N.E. 718 (1931).
16. See, e.g., Kruglikov v. Kruglikov, 29 Misc.2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
Kohloff v. Bronx Sav. Bank, 37 Misc. 2d 27, 233 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1962).
17. See People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419, 425-26, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75-76
(1982). See also Yellin, supra note 7, at 114-21.
18. See generally Yellin, supra note 7, at 114-21.
19. See Reutkemeier v. Nolte, 179 Iowa 342, 161 N.W. 290 (1917).
20. Traditionally, the clergyman-communicant privilege was applied only to Roman Catholic
priests and ministers of Christian churches. See, e.g., Knight, 80 Ind. 201 (privilege denied to
elder and deacon of church acting on behalf of church pastor); State v. Morehous, 97 N.J.L.
285, 117 A. 296 (1922).
21. See, e.g., In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 604, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931).
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been extended to draft counselors, 22 "elders" of the church, 2a nuns, 24 and
25
part-time preachers.
Although contrary authority exists, 26 it is well-established that the clergyman-communicant privilege, and the right to waive the privilege, belong
to the communicant. 27 A communicant has the privilege to refuse to disclose,
and to prevent another from disclosing, a communication made in confidence
to a clergyman. 28 Under the minority view, however, the privilege is said to
exist for the benefit of both parties, and the privilege as well as the right
to waive it may be claimed by either the clergyman or the communicant.29
Little disagreement exists concerning the type of communication protected
by the clergyman-communicant privilege. The privilege arises not because
statements are made to a clergyman-it is clear that mere conversation to
a member of the clergy will not invoke the privilege. 0 Instead, the law
protects only confidential communications made to a clergyman by a person
seeking penitenial confession3' or spiritual advice. 32 The communication
must originate because of the confidential relationship between the two
parties and it must "imply that the information should forever remain a
3
secret in the breast of the confidential adviser." 1
22. See In re Verplank, 329 F. Supp. 433, 436 (D.C. Calif. 1971).
23. See Reutkemeier, 179 Iowa at 346-51, 161 N.W. at 293; Cimijotti v. Paulsen, 219 F.
Supp. 621 (N.D. Iowa 1963). Contra Knight, 80 Ind. 210.
24. See Eckmann v. Board of Educ. of Hawthorne School Dist., 106 F.R.D. 70, 72 (E.D.
Mo. 1985) (sister's performance of priestly functions recognized by Catholic Church and her
position as spiritual advisor were sufficient to invoke the privilege).
25. See FED. R. EvID. 5-06(a)(1), Committee Note at 95 (Prelim. Draft 1969),which states:
However, it (the privilege) is not so broad as to include self-denominated "ministers." A fair construction of the language requires that the person to whom the
status is sought to be attached be regularly engaged in activities conforming at
least in a general way with those of a Catholic priest, Jewish rabbi, or minister
of an established Protestant denomination, though not necessarily on a full-time
basis. (emphasis added).
26. Seidman, 724 F.2d at 416 (priest-penitent privilege belongs to the clergyman, not the
communicant).
27. E.g., People v. Lipsczinska, 212 Mich. 484, 493, 180 N.W. 617, 620 (1920); In re
Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967); People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419,
425, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72, 75 (1982).
28. See, e.g., Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 425, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 75. This view implies
that a clergyman has no right to personally invoke the privilege.
29. Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589. See also 8 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2395
(McNaughton rev. 1961); CAL. EvID. CODE § 1033-34 (West Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 3715a (Vernon Supp. 1986).
30. See United States v. Gordon, 655 F.2d 478, 486 (1981) (testimony of priest not inadmissible where conversations with defendant related to business relationships, not spiritual
matters); United States v. Wells, 446 F.2d 2, 4 (2d Cir. 1971) (communication between injured
person and pastor involved only social conversation and was not privileged).
31. E.g., Mullen, 263 F.2d at 277; Reutkemeier, 179 Iowa at 346-51, 161 N.W. at 293.
32. See, e.g., Wells, 446 F.2d at 4; Keenan v. Gigante, 47 N.Y.2d. 160, 166, 390 N.E.2d
1151, 1154, 407 N.Y.S.2d 163 (1979); Puglisi v. Pignato 26 A.D.2d 817, 274 N.Y.S.2d 213
(1966); Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d at 18, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 847. See generally Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d
794, 808-09 (1976).
33. Swenson, 183 Minn. at 605, 237 N.W. at 591. See also Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d at 18,
217 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
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The mere fact that a communication seeking spiritual aid is made in
confidence, however, does not automatically trigger the privilege. For example, the privilege ordinarily does not protect those communications made
to a clergyman which are overheard by a third party.3 4 In an effort to combat

the potential inequity of this situation, some courts endorse the view that
the presence of third parties does not necessarily destroy the privilege, so
long as the information is given in confidence. 35 These courts give two reasons
for this position: first, the presence of third parties does not affect the
clergyman's capacity to give spiritual advice; second, the presence of third

of discipline enjoined by the rules
parties may be necessary "in the course
36
or practices of such religious body."

Many clergyman-communicant statutes require that privileged communication be made by the communicant "in the course of the discipline enjoined
by the church." 3 7 While the phrase "in the course of the discipline enjoined
by the church" usually refers to the rules and regulations of a religious
denomination,38 the phrase is subject to varying interpretations. The traditional view interprets "discipline" to mean a rule required by the religious
entity.39 Under this view, the privilege attaches only if the communication
is required by ecclesiastical doctrine as an official ritual of the religion.Although a minority of courts still adhere to this interpretation, 4' it is not
the preferred construction since it is likely to favor some religions over
others. 42 Other courts recognize that all persons seeking spiritual guidance
are entitled to receive the protection of the privilege, regardless4 3of whether
church.

such communication is required by the communicant's

34. See, e.g., People v. Diercks, 88 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 411 N.E.2d 97--(1980) (privilege
destroyed by the presence of a third party). See generally Warshawsky, Privilege: The Rule
and Its Limits, 63 MIcH. B.J. 43 (1984).
35. E.g., Kruglikov, 29 Misc. 2d 17, 217 N.Y.S.2d 875; Bolyea v. First Presbyterian Church
of Wilton, 196 N.W.2d 149 (N.D. 1972). Similarly, the presence of a third party does not
necessarily destroy the attorney-client privilege. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2311, at 601-02.
36. Swenson, 183 Minn. at 603-05, 237 N.W. at 590-91. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
37. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §
13-90-107 (Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 600.2156 (West 1986).
38. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 29, § 2395, n.1; Annot., 22 A.L.R.2D 1152, 1153 (1952).
39. See Buuck v. Kruckeberg, 121 Ind. App. 262, 266-72, 95 N.E.2d 304, 306-07 (1950);
Ball v. State, 275 Ind. 617, 618-24, 419 N.E.2d 137, 139-40 (1981); Knight, 80 Ind. at 203-04;
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 557, 559, 221 S.W.2d 87, 89 (1949). See generally Hogan,
A Modern Problem on the Privilege of the Confessional,6 Loy. L. REV. 1 (1951); See Annot.,
supra note 11.
40. The most clear example is that of penitential confession as required by Codex Juris
Canonici Canon 906 of the Roman Catholic Church.
41. See, e.g., People v. Smith, unreported case, quoted in Privileged Communications to
Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 198, 209-13 (1955); Mullen, 263 F.2d at 277 (stating that it would
be more clear that the communication was privileged if a priest and penitent were involved
"where the priest is known to be bound to silence by the discipline and laws of his church")
(emphasis added).
42. See infra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
43. E.g., Swenson, 183 Minn. at 602, 237 N.W. at 589.
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As this section has illustrated, clergyman-communicant statutes often contain ambiguous language, leaving the courts with great discretion to determine
which communications should be protected." The courts are often evasive
in identifying precisely why a particular communication does not fall within
the protection of the statutes. 4 Although courts and legislatures have attempted to delineate who a "clergyman" is, to whom a confidentiality
privilege belongs, and when a communication is "confidential," the outcomes
of the cases are varied. Against this historical background, the constitutionality of the clergyman-communicant statutes will be examined.

II.

THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The first amendment's establishment clause prohibits government sponsorship of religion by requiring that government neither aid nor formally
establish a religion. 46 Additionally, it forbids government action which tends
to either promote or discourage religious worship.47 In its effort to define
the appropriate relationship between religion and government, as required
by the establishment clause, 48 the Supreme Court has used several tests.
The primary test which the Supreme Court employs to determine whether
a government practice violates the establishment clause is the tripartite test
established in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 49 While the Lemon test has not been
mechanically applied to every establishment clause case since its adoption
in 1972,50 it has been characterized as the "fundamental tool of establishment
clause analysis." 5'
A.

The Lemon Test

The Lemon test requires that the challenged government activity satisfy
three criteria: first, the government activity must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; third, it must not foster an excessive government entan-

44. See, e.g., Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 426-27, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 75.
45. See Gillooley v. State, 58 Ind. 182 (1877); In re Koeller's Estate, 162 Kan. 395, 176
P.2d 544 (1947).
46. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 17.1 at 1031 (1976).
47. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971).
48. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Rel. Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973) ("It
has never been thought ... possible ... to enforce a regime of total separation, and as a
consequence cases arising under these [religion] clauses have presented some of the most
perplexing questions to come before this Court.").
49. 403 U.S. 602.
50. E.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); reh'g denied, 466 U.S. 994 (1984); Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). See infra text accompanying notes 95-118.
51. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 696 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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glement with religion." If the challenged government activity violates any
of these three principles, it will be held unconstitutional. 3 Each prong of
Lemon must be applied to the clergyman-communicant statutes in order to
determine whether they can withstand the scrutiny of the establishment
clause.
1.

The Purpose Prong

The purpose prong of the Lemon test seeks to determine whether the
state's actual purpose in enacting a clergyman-communicant privilege statute
is to endorse or disapprove of religion.14 If the purpose of the statute is
either to promote or impede religious belief, the statute is unconstitutional
even though the burden on, or the benefit to, religion may be indirect. 5 If,
on the other hand, the state regulates conduct by enacting general laws with
the purpose of advancing the state's secular goals, the statute satisfies the
6
purpose prong of Lemon.
Everson v. Board of Education57 and McGowan v. Maryland' are illustrative of cases in which the Supreme Court has found a valid secular
purpose. In Everson, the Supreme Court allowed state funds to be used to
pay transportation costs of pupils attending parochial schools, a permission
that certainly provided at least indirect aid to religion. The Court found
that the state had a secular purpose in providing all children with transportation to and from school and that this interest benefited all children
regardless of religious affiliation.59 Similarly in McGowan, the Court held
that Sunday closing laws were of a valid secular, rather than religious,
character.6 The purpose of the laws was to provide a uniform day of rest

52. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lemon test is actually a compilation of previous
establishment clause analyses by the Supreme Court. The purpose and effect prongs were
initially articulated in School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222
(1963). The entanglement prong originated in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
53. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam), reh'g denied, 499
U.S. 1104 (1981). In Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1983), the Court emphasized
that each of the three prongs of the Lemon test must be satisfied independently in order for
the government action to pass muster under the establishment clause.
54. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. For an example of the Court's use of the purpose prong, see
Stone, 449 U.S. at 41-42.
The existence of a secular purpose for government action has been described by one
commentator as "the most fundamental requirement in the constitutional system designed to
secure religious autonomy." L. TRME, AimiucAN CONsxrrUToNA LAW § 514-8, at 835.
55. For an example of indirect state aid to religion see Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1 (1947), reh'g denied, 330 U.S. 855 (1947).
56. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 869 (1961); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
57. 330 U.S. 1.
58. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
59. Everson, 330 U.S. at 4.
60. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 426.
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for all citizens-the fact that the day was Sunday, a day of particular
significance for the dominant
Christian sects, did not bar the state from
6
achieving its secular goals. '
Unlike Everson and McGowan, the state has no obvious secular purpose
for enacting a clergyman-communicant privilege. Secular purposes which the
Supreme Court has traditionally held to be valid usually allow for benefit
to all members of the general public. 62 Since a clergyman-communicant
privilege is available only to religious persons and is not extended to the
general public, the state makes clear its intent to benefit only religious
persons.
The state may, however, have a compelling interest in protecting the
morality of its citizens. The privilege enables persons to seek confidential
ethical guidance 63 which, the state claims, promotes a moral sense of wellbeing and leads its citizens to abstinence from future crimes and wrongdoings. 64 The flaw in this reasoning, however, is that even though the state
may have a legitimate secular interest in protecting the morality of its citizens,
the clergyman-communicant privilege benefits only moral guidance obtained
through religious means. By advancing only religious moral guidance, the
state runs afoul of the establishment clause.
The state may also enact a clergyman-communicant confidentiality statute
in order to protect the judiciary from unnecessary clashes with religion. The
state believes that without the statute, the judiciary will be in direct conflict
with religion each time a clergyman refuses to testify. 65 The court will be
forced to hold the clergyman in contempt of court and fine or imprison
him, which will foster public resentment and criticism of the judiciary.
This reasoning will probably not withstand scrutiny, as the judiciary is
constantly under attack from a variety of public sources. Public criticism
of government is a healthy outlet for aggressions and is necessary for a
marketplace of ideas to interact with one another.6 The clergyman-communicant statute is probably intended to protect religion and clergymen from
this confrontation, not the judiciary. Since the statute serves to directly
benefit and protect religion from this public confrontation, it appears to
have no secular purpose.

61. Id.
62. E.g., Everson, 330 U.S. I (secular purpose found in transporting children to and from
school); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (secular purpose found in providing members
of society with unemployment compensation).
63. Reese, supra note 2, at 60, 82.
64. Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity, and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1956).
65. See, e.g., In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931).
66. In Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622, the Court stated: "Ordinarily political debate and division,
however vigorous or even partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic
system of government."
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Another flaw in the state's reasoning is that when a legislature enacts a
testimonial privilege, it intends to protect the communication process between
the involved parties, so as to benefit the environment in which this communication takes place. 67 When the state enacts an attorney-client privilege,
it enhances the communication process between attorney and client because
the client is encouraged to reveal the truth to his attorney.68 This process,
in turn, benefits the legal system as a whole because attorneys are better
able to represent their clients when they know the truth. 69 Likewise, the
physician-patient privilege promotes effective communication between physician and patient. In this manner, patients obtain the best medical treatment
and the field of medicine is ultimately benefited because physicians can
provide better medical care.70 It follows, therefore, that the clergymancommunicant privilege is enacted to promote effective communication between clergymen and communicants, which ultimately benefits the entire
religious community. Exempting clergymen from their civil obligation to
testify in court, therefore, makes the state and religion partners in promoting
religious worship, a partnership which is prohibited by the establishment
clause.
Although specific legislative intent in granting a clergyman-communicant
privilege is difficult to ascertain, 7 the constitutional analysis presented in
this section indicates that a religious privilege statute is created solely to
encourage religious practice.7 2 As a result, a clergyman-communicant privilege

67. 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 148 (1976) (speaking of marital privilege):
It is an established rule of common law, adopted for the protection of the
institution of marriage, that neither party to a marriage may be a witness in favor
of one against the other ... [t]he design of this doctrine is to promote and
encourage the utmost confidence between husband and wife and thus aid in the
preservation of the marriage status.
See also id. at § 231 (speaking of the physician-patient privilege):
Statutes making communications between physician and patient privileged are
intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him in making a full
disclosure to the physician as to his symptoms and conditions... and are thus
designed to promote the efficacy of the physician's advice or treatment.
68. Id. at § 172.
69. Id.
70. See supra note 67.
71. Reese, supra note 2, at 60.
72. The purpose in enacting clergyman-communicant statutes can be analogized to the nonsecular motives found in the prayer in public school cases. In School Dist. of Abington
Township, 374 U.S. 203 and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court found no substantial
secular purpose in the state requiring Bible reading and prayer in public schools. The Court
rejected the argument that the state has a secular purpose in teaching morals, history, and
literature. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 41 ("IT]he pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom walls was plainly religious in nature .... [N]o legislative recitation
of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact.").
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violates the Lemon test by virtue of its noncompliance with the secular
purpose prong, and this in itself is sufficient to show a violation of the
establishment clause. 7 The statutes may also be analyzed, however, under
the effect prong of the test, as an alternative way of finding a violation of
the Lemon test.
2.

The Effect Prong

The effect prong of Lemon asks whether, regardless of the state's actual
purpose, a statute does in fact endorse or disapprove of religion. 74 If the
immediate effect of a statute is to benefit or hinder religion, the law violates
the effect prong and must be struck down. Governmental action, however,
which causes only indirect, remote, or incidental benefits to religion does
not violate the effect prong. 75 Under the effect prong of the Lemon test, a
statute will be declared unconstitutional only if it is shown to have the effect
76
of communicating a message of government endorsement of religion.
When a statute is shown to violate the secular purpose prong of Lemon,
it is usually shown to have a resulting non-secular effect.7 7 Since, as previously
discussed, the state has no secular purpose for enacting a statutory clergymancommunicant privilege, the immediate effect of the statute is to endorse
religious beliefs. The analysis used to show that the state has no secular
purpose in enacting the statute may also be used to demonstrate that the
statute has a resulting religious effect. 78 A statutory clergyman-communicant
privilege has the effect of establishing religion because the state has chosen
to benefit religion at the expense of jeopardizing a very important secular
interest. The state has a vital interest in establishing a system of justice
designed to ascertain the truth. 79 A clergyman-communicant privilege, however, contravenes this important secular goal by excusing clergymen from
their testimonial duties. While other privileges also contravene this secular
interest, when a statutory clergyman-communicant privilege is involved, religion is promoted at the expense of other societal goals. A religious con-

73. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) where the Supreme Court stated
that "no consideration of the second or third criteria [of the Lemon test] is necessary if the
statute does not have a clear secular purpose." Id. at 2490.
74. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
75. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 771.
76. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See generally School Dist. of
Abington Township, 374 U.S. 203.
77. See, e.g., Larkin, 459 U.S. 116.
78. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text.
79. See Louisell & Crippin, Evidentiary Privileges, 40 MINN. L. REV. 413 (1956); Quick,
Privileges Under the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 26 U. CIN. L. REV. 537 (1957). But see
Hogan, A Modern Problem on the Privilegeof the Confessional,6 LoY. L. Ray. 1 (1951); Privileged
Communications to Clergymen, I CATH. LAW. 199 (1955).
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fidentiality statute, therefore, has the immediate effect of promoting religion
and hence violates the effect prong of Lemon.
3.

The Excessive Entanglement Prong

Although a clergyman-communicant statute violates both the purpose and
effect prongs of the Lemon test, it also violates the establishment clause
under the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon. This prong seeks to
determine whether the existence of a statute advances excessive government
entanglement with religion. 0 Excessive governmental entanglement in religious affairs interferes with the independence of religious institutions and
gives them access to governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents
of religion. 8'
In Lemon, the Court found that the government excessively interfered
with religion. The state had enacted a statute to fund a salary supplement
for secular teachers of non-religious subjects in sectarian schools. 2 The
statute required comprehensive and continuing state surveillance to ensure
that the teachers receiving the salary benefit did not teach religious beliefs. 3
Government officials were required to examine school records in order to
determine the amount of the total expenditures which supported religious
activities.8 4 The Court found the provision unconstitutional because it presented a danger of excessive government entanglement with religion.8 5 The
Court feared that the state evaluation and inspection required by the aid
provision would cause the sort of entanglement forbidden by the Constitution.16 In invalidating the aid program, Lemon became the first case to
use excessive entanglement as its primary justification for invalidating a
law. 7

The lower courts are uncertain as to the application of entanglement
theory 88 and have applied the entanglement test inconsistently. In an effort
to provide guidance in this area, the Lemon Court determined that excessiveness of governmental entanglement with religion is estimated by evaluating three factors. First, the character and purpose of the religious institution
to be benefited. Second, the nature of the state aid to religion. Third, the
resulting relationship between the state and the religious entity. 9
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613.
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-07.
Id. at 619.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 625.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 602.

88. Serritella, Tangling with Entanglement: Toward a ConstitutionalEvaluation of ChurchState Contacts, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring, 1981, at 143, 147.
89. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 615.
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First, the Court is likely to find the character and purpose of the religious
institutions which are benefited by the state's clergyman-communicant privilege to be pervasively religious. Religious indoctrination is obviously the
core of these religious organizations' existence, because they are organized
systems of religious faith and worship. Since the Court has found parochial
schools to be pervasively religious, 90 it will most certainly find these organizations to be primarily religious in nature. The Court has held that if the
character of the organization is pervasively religious or its purpose is religious
indoctrination, the aid to these organizations is suspect.9'
Second, the Court has held that if the nature of the governmental aid
benefits religion directly, the aid may not be given.9 2 Although the aid which
a clergyman-communicant privilege provides to religious organizations is
intangible, the privilege does provide a benefit to organized religion. The
privilege helps to strengthen the moral fiber of the religious organization by
giving its members peace of mind in knowing that their inner-most secrets
will remain confidential. In this manner, the privilege directly aids religious
organizations.
Third, if, as a result of enactment of a law aiding religion, the resulting
relationship is likely to be a continuing and intimate one, the Court will
find excessive entanglement. 93 By promulgating a religious confidentiality
statute, the state is in a position to decide which religious communications
should remain confidential, and which will be left unprotected by the statute.
In order to make these decisions, the state will interfere with, and inquire
into, the intimate disciplines of the religions in an effort to evaluate religious
practices. Since a religious confidentiality statute launches state investigations
into religious doctrines and provides for government surveillance of religious
institutions, it leaves the state and religion closely intertwined, a result
94
forbidden by the establishment clause.
In conclusion, a clergyman-communicant statute violates all three prongs
of the Lemon test because it has no secular purpose, its primary effect is
to advance religion, and it fosters excessive governmental entanglement with
religion. Under the Lemon test, a clergyman-communicant statute should be
declared unconstitutional since it appears to establish religion.

90. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
91. Id. at 362-66 (1975) (parochial schools so pervasively religious that religious aspect
cannot be separated from non-religious aspect, making excessive entanglement a result); see
also Comment, Cessation of the Excessive Entanglement Test and the Establishmentof Religion,
7 Ono N.U.L. REv. 975, 981 (1980) (aid impermissible to "pervasively religious" schools).
92. Meek, 421 U.S. at 363.
93. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619 (excessive entanglement exists where relationship between church
and state likely to be continuing and intimate); Comment, supra note 91, at 985 (auditing
provision leads to continuing and intimate relationship between church and state which generates
excessive entanglement).
94. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
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B.

Other Establishment Clause Tests

Although the Lemon test is the standard primarily applied by the Supreme
Court in establishment cases, the Court has referred to the test as a "mere
guideline" 9 and has warned that it will not be bound by a single test in
this area. 96 Even though the clergyman-communicant privilege appears to
violate Lemon, an inquiry into other tests used by the Supreme Court is
necessary to determine whether clergyman-communicant statutes violate the
establishment clause.
1. The Larson Test
While the Lemon test is employed to scrutinize laws which afford a uniform
preference to religion over non-religion, the Supreme Court has suggested
a different test for laws which are challenged as favoring some religions
over others. The test articulated in Larson v. Valente97 is employed when a
law is claimed to discriminate among religions. Under the Larson test, the
Court applies a strict scrutiny standard and proclaims a statute to be in
violation of the establishment clause unless a compelling governmental interest exists, and the state is using the least restrictive means available to
accomplish its objectives. 98
Several states' clergyman-communicant statutes extend a confidentiality
privilege exclusively to members of certain religious denominations and deny
the privilege to members of other denominations." These statutes, as typically
interpreted, grant the privilege only to those members of churches which
require their members to attend the Sacrament of Penance and which require
their clergymen to remain silent regarding the content of confessions. '0 Since

95. See Meek, 421 U.S. 349; Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971).
96. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678, where the Court recognizes that a total separation of church
and state is not possible and that absolutist views of the establishment clause are to be avoided.
As stated by the Court: "In each case, the inquiry calls for line drawing; no fixed per se rule
can be framed. The establishment clause like the due process clauses is not a precise detailed
provision in a legal code capable of ready application." Id. at 678.
97. 465 U.S. 228 (1982). In Larson, the Court invalidated portions of a Minnesota law
regulating charitable contributions. The challenge was directed at a provision which exempted
religious organizations which received over fifty percent of their total contributions from its
members from registration and reporting requirements. The Court found that the exemption
scheme discriminated against churches which are "new and lacking in a constituency" or which
"favor public solicitation over general reliance on financial support from members." Id. at
24647 n.23. The scheme thus violated the establishment clause as it made "explicit and deliberate
distinctions between different religious organizations." Id.
98. Larson, 456 U.S. at 24647.
99. E.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2233, 13-4062(3) (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 13-90-107 (Supp. 1986). See generally Reese, supra note 2, at 87.
100. The Sacrament of Confession is a component part of the Roman Catholic Church's
Sacrament of Penance. Codex Juris Canonici, Canon 906 (1918) requires that the communicant
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only the Roman Catholic Church requires its members to receive the sacrament of penance'02 and demands that its priests maintain a perpetual and
inviolable secrecy,' 0 2 only the Roman Catholic Church is protected under
these statutes. 03
If the state's interest in enacting the religious confidentiality statute is to
protect confidential communication between clergymen and communicants
and to encourage persons to seek spiritual guidance, a statute which prefers
some religions over others does not effectively promote this interest. A
discriminatory clergyman-communicant statute affords benefits to the favored religion which are not available to other denominations and, therefore,
discourages confidential communication and religious counseling in minority
denominations.
The non-favored religions are stigmatized because the existence of the
confidentiality privilege gives the appearance that the Roman Catholic Church
is the politically favored denomination. 10 When one religious denomination
is given total support of the legislature, other minority religions feel coerced
to conform to this politically favored religion,'0 5 for "fg]overnment endorsement of particular religious denominations sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
or favored members of the political community."'' 6
The state does not have a compelling governmental interest for enacting
a classification scheme which extends a confidentiality privilege to a communicant of one denomination but denies it to communicants of all other
denominations.3 0 The doctrine of confidentiality is nearly the same in all
religions-most denominations require that the communication seeking the
spiritual guidance be given in confidence.' 0 8 Also, the communicant's need
for secrecy is the same in all denominations.'°0 The communicant is seeking
spiritual guidance, and the Catholic seeking spiritual guidance is no more

attend the Sacrament of Penance once a year. Codex Juris Canonici, Canon 890, sec. 2 (1918)
provides that confessors are not allowed to use any information about sins obtained in the
confessional in their external guidance.
I01. Codex Juris Canonici, Canon 906 (1918).
102. Codex Juris Canonici, Canon 890, sec. 2 (1918). See also Macartney & Regan, Professional Secrecy and Privileged Communications, 2 CATH. LAw. 3, 4 (1956) (of the many secret
communications thus protected, the secrecy of the confessional communications is most sacrosanct).
103. See Swenson, 183 Minn. at 603, 237 N.W. at 590 ("If the only 'confession' that is
privileged is the compulsory one under the rules of the particular church, it would be applicable
only to the priest of the Roman Catholic Church").
104. Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Reagan, 607 F. Supp. 747
(E.D. Penn. 1985).
105. Engle, 370 U.S. at 431.
106. School Dist. of Abington Township, 374 U.S. 203, 226.
107. See Reese, supra note 2, at 87.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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deserving of this protection than a member of any other denomination., °
Communicants have the same feelings of guilt, sin, or an unscrupulous
conscience regardless of which religious denomination they belong to.
Further evidence of the state's lack of compelling interest in giving a
confidentiality privilege only to Roman Catholic priests is that no other
privilege statutes, such as attorney-client or doctor-patient, award a privilege
solely upon status. The law does not make the disciplines of a certain group
of attorneys or doctors the determining factor in granting a privilege.",'
Instead, the nature of the relationship between the attorney and client, for
example, is the sole determining factor in granting a confidentiality privilege.
Likewise, in granting a clergyman-communicant privilege, the nature of the
relationship between the clergyman and the communicant should be the only
factor which determines whether the privilege will attach; the discipline
practiced by a certain religion should be irrelevant. Those clergyman-communicant statutes which favor the Roman Catholic Church over other religions fail not only the Lemon test, but also the strict scrutiny analysis
required by Larson. 2
2.

The Historical Analysis Test

Another way in which the Supreme Court analyzes government action
under the establishment clause is to inquire into the intent of the framers
of the Constitution. In Marsh v. Chambers,",3 the Court upheld the Nebraska
Legislature's practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a
chaplain paid by the state, and it did not apply any of the formal tests
which have structured the Court's inquiry under the establishment clause.
The Court relied on history to sustain this activity and it examined the
specific features of this practice in light of a long history of acceptance of
legislative and other official prayers. 114 The Court noted that a paid chaplain
has been present in Congress since 17 74,111 and that seventeen members of

110. Id.
11l. Id.
112. Since the state cannot demonstrate a compelling interest for religious confidentiality
statutes which discriminate between denominations, there is no need to inquire whether the

state is using the least restrictive means available to accomplish its interest, which would be
the second prong of the Larson test.
113. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
114. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. There, the Court noted the history of a paid Chaplain in
Congress. The Court viewed prayer in this context as "unique" in its historical roots. As stated
by the Court:
The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative public bodies with
prayer is deeply embedded in the history and tradition of this country. From
colonial times through the founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice
of legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and
religious freedom.
115. Lynch, 463 U.S. at 786 (discussing the Marsh case).
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the First Congress in 1789 were also constitutional convention delegates who
approved legislation providing for paid chaplains in the House and Senate.
The Court concluded that the framers were obviously aware of the presence
of this religious activity within Congress. ' 6 Since the framers did not explicitly declare this practice unconstitutional in the Constitution, they conveyed their endorsement of such activity.
Marsh is clearly an exceptional case, and few cases will fall within the
realm of its holding. No evidence exists to suggest that the framers endorsed,
or even considered, the clergyman-communicant privilege. The privilege was
not in existence in England or the United States at the time the Constitution
was drafted." 7 In fact, the first clergyman-communicant statute was enacted
in the United States in 1828,"1 nearly forty years after the drafting of the
Constitution. A clergyman-communicant privilege therefore cannot be upheld
on the basis of Marsh.
C. Summary
This Note has shown that clergyman-communicant statutes violate the
establishment clause. The next step, however, is to determine whether a
denial of the privilege will violate the free exercise clause. In other words,
the religious confidentiality privilege might be saved from invalidity through
a free exercise analysis. Statutes which appear to violate the establishment
clause may be constitutional if they are necessary to promote the free exercise
of religion.
III.

FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE

The free exercise clause of the first amendment protects religious practice
by forbidding government interference with the free exercise of religious

beliefs." 9 The free exercise clause also guarantees the right of every citizen
to choose his own religion, free of any interference by the state.

20

The

Supreme Court uses strict scrutiny to determine whether a statute violates
the free exercise clause.' 2' Strict scrutiny analysis in free exercise cases consists
of three parts. First, the Court determines whether the state statute places
a burden on the free exercise of religion. Second, if the statute infringes
upon free exercise of a religious belief, the state's interference withstands
116. For a full discussion, see Yellin, supra note 7, at 106.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Spiritual counseling is considered a "religious belief." Confidential communication to
a clergyman is a religious belief if it "has reference to a penitential acknowledgement to a
clergyman of actual or supposed wrongdoing while seeking religious or spiritual advice, aid,
or comfort." In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 603, 237 N.W. 589, 590 (1931).
120. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
121. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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scrutiny only if the state's interest outweighs the religious interest embodied
in the religious practice.' 22 Third, the state's interest must be promoted by
23
the least restrictive means available.
Examination of a clergyman-communicant statute under the free exercise
clause presents a novel situation. In the usual case, the state enacts a regulation which, an individual claims, interferes with the exercise of religious
beliefs. In the case of a clergyman-communicant privilege, however, the
statute serves as an endorsement of the principle of religious freedom because
it promotes the free exercise of religion. The free exercise clause thus is
triggered only if a clergyman-communicant privilege is denied. In order to
analyze the free exercise implications of a clergyman-communicant privilege,
the repeal of the statute granting the privilege therefore must be presumed.
If the statute is mandated by the free exercise clause, then it cannot be said
to be unconstitutional despite its apparent noncompliance with the various
establishment clause tests.

A.

The Burden on Free Exercise of Religion

The first step in any free exercise claim is to determine whether a "religious" interest exists which is worthy of first amendment protection. In
order to have the protection of the first amendment, free exercise claims
must be "rooted in religious belief."' 2 The Supreme Court has held repeatedly that beliefs are religious as long as they are deeply held and based
25
upon moral or ethical principles.
Both a clergyman's and a communicant's belief in the process of confidential spiritual healing is likely to be a belief which a court will find to be
deeply based upon moral or ethical principles. 26 Cleansing one's soul of sins
122. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Note, Are Churches Above the Law? The
Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act and the Equal Pay Provisions of Title VII to
Religious Organizations, 40 U. PTTr. L. REv. 465, 474 (1979). In Braunfeld v. Brown, the
Court distinguished a direct burden on free exercise from an indirect burden. See Braunfeld
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (Sunday closing law indirectly, rather than directly, burdened
merchants' free exercise rights). The burden on merchants' free exercise rights was indirect in
Braunfeld because the state did not act directly to prohibit the practice of religious beliefs, but
merely made the practice more expensive. Id. at 606-07. Recently the Supreme Court rejected
the direct-indirect burden distinction. See Thomas v. Review Board, 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (any
substantial burden on free exercise must be sustained by compelling state interest).
123. See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. 707 (inquiring into burden on free exercise, state interest,
and least restrictive alternative). Since Sherbert, the least restrictive alternative has become a
necessary component of free exercise analysis. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398.
124. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
125. E.g., Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 342-44 (1970).
126. See Swenson, 183 Minn. at 605, 237 N.W. at 591, where the Court states:
Man, regardless of his religious affiliation, whose conscience is shrunken and
whose soul is puny, enters the clergyman's door in despair and gloom; he there
finds consolation and hope. It is said that God through the clergy resuscitates.
The clergymen practice the thought that "the finest of all altars is the soul of
any unhappy man who is consoled and thanks God."
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by divulging them to a clergyman demonstrates a religious conviction which
is shared by all members of the communicant's religious group. There is
little doubt, therefore, that the clergyman's and the communicant's belief
in the spiritual benefits obtained as a result of 27the sharing of confidential
communication constitutes a "religious" belief.1
The Supreme Court has determined that the first amendment bars judicial
evaluation of the wisdom, truth or falsity of a religious belief for any
purpose. 28 Although the Court may not inquire into the content of religious
belief, it may examine the sincerity of the belief since religious practices are
entitled to constitutional protection only to the extent that the beliefs underlying them are sincerely held. 29 Since the Court typically conducts a
sincerity analysis on a case-by-case basis, any generalization concerning the
sincerity of every clergyman's and communicant's belief in spiritual counseling would be presumptuous. Since it has, however, been determined that
clergymen and communicants possess sufficiently "religious" beliefs in the
process of confidential spiritual communication, the beliefs are deserving of
first amendment protection as long as they are sincerely held.
Since a religious interest is present in a clergyman-communicant confidentiality statute, the next step in the analysis is to determine the extent of
the burden placed upon religious practice by a denial of a confidentiality
privilege. 30 While no formal test exists for evaluating the magnitude of a
burden upon religious practice, the Court requires that the burden be "substantial."'' A "substantial" burden is one which greatly inhibits the practice
32
of religion and, in effect, is a coercion to forego the practice.
Since it is well-established that a clergyman-communicant privilege belongs
to the communicant, " the interference with the communicant's free exercise
rights by a denial of the privilege is especially worthy of review. From the
communicant's point of view, requiring a clergyman to reveal confidential
communication endangers a function essential to the practice of the communicant's religious beliefs. If the privilege is denied, a communicant will
feel inhibited from disclosing confidential or personal information because
there is a chance that the information may be disclosed to the public. Since
the purpose of spiritual counseling is a spiritual "cleansing of the soul,"
See supra note 126 and accompanying text. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85 (1965).
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 205.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
As noted by the Court in Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717-18,
[W~here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct
mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent
to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.
While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.
133. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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the value of this communication is destroyed if the communicant is reluctant
to reveal his innermost personal feelings.3 14 A denial of the privilege burdens
the communicant's practice of religion because it inhibits the seeking of
spiritual guidance-an activity essential to the practice of his religion.
The communicant may also believe that the free exercise of his religious
beliefs is hampered because his salvation and hope for eternal happiness is
endangered by a denial of the privilege. This claim is similar to the assertion
raised by the Amish in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 3 In Yoder, the Court recognized
the Amish belief that if the state compelled Amish children to go to high
school, the state would put the Amish salvation in danger. 3 6 A communicant
desiring confidentiality of confessions similarly believes the Court should
prohibit state interference with his religious beliefs when his salvation is at
stake. Therefore, repeal of clergyman-communicant statutes for establishment clause reasons will violate the communicant's free exercise of religion.
A clergyman may likewise claim that being compelled to testify violates
his conscience and sacred duty and therefore interferes with his free exercise
of religion. 317 A clergyman who follows the law and is forced to reveal
confidential communication may be punished by religious sanctions, such as
denunciation or loss of religious functions and sacramental benefits. 3 On
the other hand, a clergyman who chooses to disobey the law by following
his religious convictions and refusing to testify may face secular punishment,
such as contempt of court charges. Since a clergyman is forced to choose
between following his religious convictions and following the law, the free
exercise of his religious beliefs has obviously been abridged.
B.

The State's Compelling Interest

Since a denial of a clergyman-communicant confidentiality privilege burdens the practice of religious beliefs, the state must show that it has a
compelling interest in denying the privilege. 39 Burdens on religion are tolerated by the Court whenever they are incident to regulation of other state
activities and when the state's interest overrides the importance of the religious practice. 140 Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional-the state
may justify a limitation on religious liberty by showing that the limitation
is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.1' 4
134. For example, the value of the communication is destroyed when it is overheard by a
third party. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
135. 406 U.S. 205.
136. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-09.
137. In re Williams, 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317 (1967), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 918 (1967).
See infra text at note 138.
138. Stoyles, supra note 8, at 51.
139. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
140. NowAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 46, § 17.4 at 1053 (1983).
141. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-58 (1982).
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Although prior analysis under the purpose prong of Lemon revealed that
the state has no secular purpose in enacting the clergyman-communicant
privilege, 42 the state may have a compelling secular interest in denying the
privilege because there may be situations where societal interest dictates that
the privilege not apply. Prohibition of activities claimed to be based on, or
required by, religious tenets is constitutional if such conduct jeopardizes
public health, safety, or morals.'43
A compelling interest which the state may claim in denying the privilege
is that granting the privilege will, in certain instances, jeopardize the safety
of third persons. For example, if a communicant confidentially reveals to a
clergyman that he recently maliciously beat up a person and left them to
die,' 44 most clergymen would feel bound by their religious tenets to keep
this life-threatening information secret. 45 Granting the privilege in this instance might result in the loss of a human life, while denying the privilege,
even though some clergymen will still refuse to reveal the confidence, could
result in the saving of a human life.
A more general state interest is that of assuring full admission of testimony
for the administration of justice.146 If a confidentiality privilege is granted,
facts are hidden from the tribunal which, if they are revealed, will aid in
the administration of justice. In In re Williams, 147a Baptist minister was
held in contempt of court and sentenced to ten days in jail for refusing to
testify in a rape case. The minister believed that it would violate his moral
duty as a Christian minister to testify to any matters within his knowledge
concerning the matter on trial. The North Carolina Supreme Court was
142. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (Christian Scientists' religious
objections to required vaccination overruled); People v. Pierson, 176 N.Y. 201, 68 N.E. 243
(1903) (parents failing to provide medical care for their children on grounds of religious belief
held subject to criminal prosecution).
144. In this situation, the ordinary citizen in most states has a duty to reveal such information
to law enforcement authorities. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West Supp. 1986) which
states:
Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or
aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or
escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said
principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or
convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony.
145. Sixty Minutes: Sacred Confessions (CBS television broadcast, September 22, 1985)
(interview with Father Lewis Gigante):
Ed Bradley: If you learned in a confession of a planned murder, would you go
to the authorities?
Father Lewis Gigante: Absolutely not.
Ed Bradley: Would you go to the intended victim?
Father Lewis Gigante: Absolutely not.
Ed Bradley: But you could save a life?
Father Lewis Gigante: But I could destroy an entire institution that is sacred, and
goes further than a life.
146. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1969).
147. 269 N.C. 68, 152 S.E.2d 317.
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unimpressed with this position and concluded that the minister's refusal to
testify was wilful, deliberate and unlawful. 48 The court further stated that
the freedom to exercise one's religious belief is not absolute, "4 9 and that
"[t]he 'compelling interest' of the state in the rendering of a just judgment
in accordance with its law overrides the incidental infringement upon the
religious belief of the witness that for him to testify is wrong."' 50 The state's
interest in assuring full admission of testimony may therefore constitute a
compelling reason for denying the privilege.
C.

Least Restrictive Means

The state may have an alternative manner by which to accomplish its
interest in promoting fact gathering which is less restrictive to religion than
denying a confidentiality privilege altogether.'' If the state has an interest
in establishing a system of justice aimed at ascertaining the truth, the state
has a few alternatives available other than compelling clergymen to testify.
The state could implement a system in which a clergyman is compelled to
reveal a communication privately to the judge. If the judge determines that
revelation of the information will greatly aid in the full administration of
justice, he could compel the clergyman to publicly reveal the communication.
In this scenario, the outcome is the same as when the privilege is denied.
If, however, the judge determines that the information will not significantly
further justice, the confidential communication will not be disclosed in court
and will remain in the confidence of the judge and the clergyman.
This solution, however, places less of a burden on religion only when the
confidential communication does not consist of information which would
incriminate the communicant. 5 2 If a communicant's communication contains
information regarding sins for which the state may impose a penalty, there
is a chance that this information might be publicly disclosed. The possibility
that this information might be revealed will deter individuals from seeking
religious counsel. While any possibility that a communication will be revealed
places a severe burden on religious practice, this alternative is nevertheless
a preferred alternative to denying the privilege altogether and requiring every
confidential communication to be revealed if required by the court.
Another less restrictive means available to the state is the principle of
accommodation,' which is premised upon the belief that the state should
148. Id. at 76-79, 152 S.E.2d at 324-25.
149. Id. at 79, 152 S.E.2d at 326.
150. Id. at 81, 152 S.E.2d at 327.
151. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining the permissible end, unduly to infringe the
protected freedom).
152. It should be noted that use of the clergyman-communicant privilege is not limited to
criminal cases. The privilege may also be invoked in civil cases.
153. Established in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing the freedom
of children to attend religious schools provided instruction in secular subjects meets reasonable
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accommodate the religious needs of its citizens wherever possible. If the

state has an interest in protecting citizens from imminent harm, there is a
manner in which the state can achieve this interest and minimize the burdening of religious belief. The state could enact a clergyman-communicant
privilege which includes a provision compelling a clergyman to reveal all

communications which involve threats or promises of future crime or mis4
conductY.1
This provision is similar to the exception in the psychotherapist-

patient privilege which provides a psychotherapist with the duty of disclosure
of confidential communication if an imminent danger to the patient or society
exists.' 5" Similarly, such a provision would compel a clergyman to warn

authorities or an intended victim of potential harm, while allowing the
identity of the communicant to remain confidential.
D. Summary
Denial of a clergyman-communicant privilege places a burden on both the

clergyman's and the communicant's free exercise of religion. The state,
however, appears to have two compelling interests which may be sufficient

minimum requirements of the state). Such exemptions are generally placed on the basis, inter
alia, that as a God-fearing but tolerant people, our governments should accommodate the
religious needs of its people wherever possible. Note, Church State Religious Institutions and
Values: A Legal Survey, 37 NOTRE DAME LAW. 649, 711 (1962). The principle of accommodation
was also demonstrated in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
154. It should be noted, however, that this type of statute will still probably violate the
establishment clause and hence be unconstitutional. See supra text accompanying notes 46-118.
155. The California Evidence Code specifically denies the psychotherapist-patient privilege
where there is a threat of harm to another. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966). In Tarasoff
v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14
(1976), the California Supreme Court in recognizing a psychotherapist duty to disclose a patient's
statements which threatened a third person, stated, "[T]he public policy favoring protection
of the confidential character of the patient-psychotherapist communications must yield to the
extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends
where the public peril begins." Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 349, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
A clergyman-communicant privilege could be similarly limited. The same societal considerations which dictated non-recognition of the privilege in Tarasoff would dictate its denial where
a clergyman is involved because religious counseling and psychoanalysis share many similarities.
Indeed, it has been written that "the Roman Catholic Church is beginning to suspect a certain
'rivalry' between the practice of psychoanalysis and that of confession." E. GERGGREN, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFESSION 16 (1975).

Another writer, in comparing the healing effects of the military chaplain with the psychologist

has stated that:
An effort has frequently been made at "team ministry" or "team healing."
Recognizing that there are the psychological, biological, and spiritual sides to

people, hospitals are often employing chaplains and psychologists to work side
by side. Industries are beginning to do the same. The military chaplains and
psychologists no longer see themselves as part of separate "corps" to whom
people may run in times of crises, but as significant contributors to a healthy
lifestyle of individuals.
Jones, Privileged Communication and the Military Chaplain: Some Ethical Considerations, 1
CHAPLAINCY

15, 18 (1978).
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to justify the burden placed upon religious practice. The free exercise clause
therefore does not appear to mandate revival of religious confidentiality
statutes when a compelling state interest is present. However, when no
compelling state interest is present, the absence of the clergyman-communicant privilege appears to constitute an unconstitutional burden on the free
exercise of both the clergyman's and communicant's religious beliefs.

IV.

RECONCILING THE CONFLICT

A.

The Tension

The concept of religious freedom is fraught with inherent tension because
there is a natural antagonism between a command not to establish religion
and a command not to inhibit its practice. If a law strictly enforces nonestablishment, it risks placing a burden on free exercise of religion; if it
enforces free exercise of religion, it may be accused of establishing a religion.
By way of illustration, if public property is made available for a wide range
of activities, but forbidden to religious activity, the law may impede the free
exercise of religion. On the other hand, if public property is made available
for religious worship, the government's extension of aid to religion may be
outlawed by the establishment clause.' 5 6 Each clause when carried to its
extreme, violates the other. This irreconcilable tension between the Constitution's two religion clauses often forces the Supreme Court to choose
between competing values in religion cases.
A statutory clergyman-communicant privilege appears to create an unconstitutional establishment of religion because it promotes religious practices. 5 7 Yet, as this Note has shown, the denial of the privilege may violate
the clergyman's and communicant's right to freely practice religion.'58 The
Court must seek to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the first amendment
by balancing the danger of establishing religion in allowing the privilege
against the danger to free exercise in refusing it. An examination into the
realm of possible solutions and conflicts is necessary in order to guide the
Court toward the best possible outcome.
If a religious confidentiality statute is determined to be unconstitutional
because it violates the establishment clause, a clergyman called to testify
could claim that maintaining confidences is a fundamental belief of his
religion and that disclosure would unduly impinge upon his right to practice

156. Bergman, Is the Cloth Unraveling: A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SAN. FERN.
V.L. REv. 47, 49 (1981).
157. See supra notes 46-118 and accompanying text.
158. Assuming no compelling state interest is present. See supra notes 119-55 and accompanying text.
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religion as guaranteed by the free exercise clause. 5 9 This argument was upheld
in People v. Phillips,6 0 the earliest recorded case dealing with the clergymancommunicant privilege. The Phillipscourt refused to compel a Roman Catholic priest to reveal the identity of the person who had delivered stolen goods
to the priest for return to the owner. The court concluded that forcing a
priest to violate the secrecy of the confessional would violate the free exercise
of his religion.' 6 This case, however, has not been followed in any other
decision. In fact four yars later, another court held that the ruling in Phillips
was limited to Roman Catholic priests because Protestant churches did not
62
make confession a sacrament.'
It is uncertain whether a court today, in the absence of a clergymancommunicant statute, would excuse a clergyman from testifying on the basis
that he is exercising his freedom of religion. The court may rule that the
free exercise right is overridden by the state's compelling interest in ascertaining the truth or in preventing harm to third persons. The court, on the
other hand, may feel that the state's interest in this case is not sufficiently
compelling to override the free exercise claim and will excuse the clergyman
from testifying. When the statute does not exist, therefore, a generalized
statement predicting the outcome of every case cannot be made. The court
must look to the particular facts of each case and balance the competing
63
interests involved.
When the privilege is enacted by statute, the communication expressly
spelled out in the statute is protected. When a communication to a clergyman
is left unprotected by the statute, for example if the communication was
not made within the discipline of the church' 64 or if a third party was
present, 65 a clergyman may still claim a right not to testify on the basis
that he is exercising his freedom of religion. In this case, it would seem that
by enacting the statute recognizing the privilege, the state has impliedly
waived its interests in compelling the clergyman to testify, and the balance
would be tipped in favor of upholding the free exercise claim. In reality,
the state, by enacting the statutory privilege, has most likely waived only
its interest in compelling a clergyman to testify regarding conversations

159. Id.
160. N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. (1813) (The case was not officially reported. An "editors report"

of the case is abstracted in 1 W.L.J. 109 (1843) and is quoted in Privileged Communicationsto
Clergymen, 1 CAmH. LAw. 198 (1955)).
161. Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note 160, at 207.
162. People v. Smith, N.Y. City Hall Rec. 77 (1817) (not officially reported but an "editors
report" of the case is reported in Privileged Communicationsto Clergymen, supra note 160, at
209). This holding would seem to resurrect the establishment clause problems mentioned under
the Larson test. See supra notes 97-112.
163. See infra text following note 171.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 37-40.
165. See supra text accompanying note 34.
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protected by the statute.' 66 The state probably has not waived its right to
compel a clergyman to testify regarding communication not protected by
the statute.
In Keenan v. Gigante,'67 a priest claimed that his right to practice his
religion prevented him from being compelled to reveal to the Grand Jury
information told to him in confidence. The court rejected this claim, stating
that the statutory privilege affords the priest any necessary protection against
infringement of freedom of religion and rejected the contention that the
right to practice his religion bestows more extensive protection beyond the
scope of the clergyman-communicant privilege accorded by statute. Since
the communication did not fall within the protection of the statute, it was
not privileged. Similarly, in In re Murtha,'6 the first amendment guarantee
of free exercise of religion did not prohibit the state from compelling a
Dominican sister to disclose an alleged confession. The court held that the
communication was not privileged under the statute because the sister's
refusal to testify was not dictated by the precepts of the Dominican order,
and thus was not a matter of church discipline but one of individual conscience. The court held that religious scruples must
give way to dominant
69
rights of the state to maintain peace and order.
These courts apparently reached the conclusion that the state did not waive
its right in compelling clergymen to testify regarding communication left
unprotected by the statute because it was permitted to place a burden on
the clergyman's free exercise of religion. If a court should ever endorse the
view that by enacting the statute the state has waived all government interests
in compelling any clergyman to testify, serious establishment clause implications are raised.' 70 Since the state interests, if they are asserted, may justify
a rejection of the free exercise claim, the state's waiver of its interests seems
to directly benefit (or at least remove the burden from) religion. By waiving
its interests, the state intends to benefit religion, which resurrects the estab7
lishment clause problems mentioned in Part II of this Note.' '
B.

The Solution

The constitutionality of the clergyman-communicant statute is complicated
by legal and sociological factors which are in tension with one another. To

166. See infra text accompanying notes 167-169. By waiving its interest in compelling certain
clergymen to testify and retaining its interest in requiring other clergymen to testify, the state
seems to be discriminating in favor of some religions which violates the establishment clause
under the Larson test. See supra notes 97-112 and accompanying text.
167. 47 N.Y.2d 160, 390 N.E.2d 1151, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 887 (1979).
168. 115 N.J. Super. 380, 279 A.2d 889 (1971).
169. Id. See also People v. Woodruff, 50 Misc. 2d 430, 433-34, 270 N.Y.S.2d 838, 843-44
(1966).
170. See supra notes 46-118 and accompanying text.
171. Id.
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grant a confidentiality privilege causes the suppression of evidence. Since
rules of evidence are designed to promote the ascertainment of truth, the
judicial process is thwarted to the extent that evidence of this nature is made
inadmissible. On the other side is the view that a confidence should be
respected. Clergy insist that unless confidences are safeguarded, people needing spiritual assistance will be hesitant to seek guidance and society will
suffer. They claim that the benefit of absolutely preserving these confidences
72
outweighs the benefit of encouraging collection of evidence.
Since religious confidentiality statutes violate the establishment clause, they
should be repealed. The best solution is to allow each individual to invoke
his own free exercise claim when he feels his rights are being infringed upon.
In each case the judge will balance the harm done to the individual by
revealing the communication against the harm done to society in keeping it
secret. The courts should look at the danger to third parties and the harm
to the other litigant which will occur by not revealing the communication.
The disadvantage of allowing courts to determine religious confidentiality
privileges on a case-by-case basis is that the judge may have too much
discretion to determine whether or not the communication is deserving of
confidentiality. Proponents of this view believe that the legislature is better
able to clearly delineate the scope of the privilege since the legislature can
furnish clergymen with reasonably definite guidelines to rely upon as they
perform their ministry. Allowing the courts to decide when the privilege will
be invoked will have a chilling effect upon spiritual communication since
persons will refrain from divulging confidential communication if they cannot
be certain that it will remain confidential.
However, since involving the legislature in enacting a clergyman-communicant privilege appears to create an unconstitutional establishment of
religion,' 73 the judiciary is the best branch of government to decide when a
confidentiality privilege should be invoked. The judge can best balance the
two competing interests and decide which should prevail in each case. In
reality, the courts would not be much more involved and given only a little
more discretion than they have when the statutes are enacted. 7 4 The courts
presently make the ultimate decision of deciding which communication is
protected by deciding whether it fits within the statute. 171 While involving
the courts may have some chilling effect upon spiritual communication,
judicial precedent will furnish some guidelines to persons seeking spiritual
guidance.
In final analysis, therefore, it should be the responsibility of the court to
decide which of the two competing claims before it shall prevail: that of a
172. See, e.g., In re Swenson, 183 Minn. 602, 237 N.W. 589 (1931).
173. See supra notes 46-118 and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., People v. Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d 419, 184 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1982). See

generally supra text at notes 16-45.
175. See, e.g., Thompson, 133 Cal. App. 3d at 426-27, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 76.
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state to protect its citizens from potential harm and secrets in the legal system
or that of an individual to refuse obedience because of the demands of his
conscience. The court, with its insight and experience is best able to struggle
with and resolve the complexity of this situation.
CONCLUSION

Few concepts have elicited so much judicial and political controversy as
the religion clauses of the first amendment. The religion clauses are viewed
as possessing a unitary promise of separation and freedom-separation guarantees freedom and freedom requires separation. In reality, however, the
dual nature of the clauses has led the Supreme Court to command that government chart a neutral course between avoiding involvement with religion
and intervening when necessary to insure free exercise of religion.
Such neutral course is often impossible to achieve, as is illustrated by
clergyman-communicant privilege statutes. While the existence of the statutory privilege violates the establishment clause, the free exercise clause
demands its presence. 76 The best "neutral course" is to declare such statutes
unconstitutional and invoke a case-by-case inquiry of the privilege by the
judiciary.
The courts are the best vehicle to decide which of the two claims before
it shall prevail: the state's need to elicit evidence important to the judicial
process' search for the truth or an individual's need to refuse conformity
to the laws of the state due to the sacred demands of his religion. The
constitutionality of the clergyman-communicant privilege statutes will eventually be called into question by a litigant seeking to compel the revelation
of a confidential communication, and the court will be compelled to examine
this troublesome issue.
JANE

E. MAYES

176. Assuming that the state has no overriding interest in compelling the testimony.

